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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of performing community detec-
tion on a network, while maintaining privacy, assuming that
the adversary has access to an auxiliary correlated network.
We ask the question “Does there exist a regime where the
network cannot be deanonymized perfectly, yet the com-
munity structure could be learned?.” To answer this ques-
tion, we derive information theoretic converses for the per-
fect deanonymization problem using the Stochastic Block
Model and edge sub-sampling. We also provide an almost
tight achievability result for perfect deanonymization.
We also evaluate the performance of percolation based
deanonymization algorithm on Stochastic Block Model data-
sets that satisfy the conditions of our converse. Although our
converse applies to exact deanonymization, the algorithm
fails drastically when the conditions of the converse are met.
Additionally, we study the effect of edge sub-sampling on
the community structure of a real world dataset. Results
show that the dataset falls under the purview of the idea of
this paper. There results suggest that it may be possible to
prove stronger partial deanonymizability converses, which
would enable better privacy guarantees.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data analytics is a rapidly growing field, aided by the
availability of huge amounts of data and significant comput-
ing power. An enormous part of data generation is a result
of the emergence of Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter etc. The user base of these
networks spans in millions and is still growing. These com-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita-
tion on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than
ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or re-
publish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
KDD ’16 August 13–17, 2016, San Francisco, CA, USA
c© 2019 ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-2138-9. . . $15.00
DOI: 10.1145/1235
panies and others perform data analytics for the purpose of
increasing revenues, reducing customer service costs, better
prediction and possibly prevention of attrition rates, get-
ting feedback on and improving public opinion of their prod-
ucts/services. For instance, LinkedIn has been very success-
ful in converting the data collected on their website into new
data products, such as their People You May Know feature.
Network providers also create revenue by sharing data with
other third parties who create value by performing analyt-
ics on the data. For example, due to homophily [21], OSNs
are good microcosms to study efficient advertising strategies.
With the prevalence of data analytics, concerns about user
privacy are growing too and such concerns could hamper the
former if not addressed adequately.
Preprocessing the data prior to its release, with the goal
of minimizing the risk of sharing private information of the
users, is crucial for addressing privacy concerns. Anonymiza-
tion is an essential step in the data preprocessing. Perhaps,
still the most widely used technique is the naive practice of
substituting the personal identifiers (e.g., name, IP address,
etc) by random identifiers. More clever techniques such as
k-anonymization [12, 19] and differential privacy [8, 17] are
also proposed to address the problem in suitable scenarios.
As fundamentally any anonymization technique involves
modification of the data at some level, it could possibly de-
teriorate the utility of the data for the initial analytics tasks
it was released for. This trade-off between privacy and data
utility has been noted in the literature [3, 18], but a theo-
retical understanding of this trade-off is still missing.
Contributions. We investigate the feasibility of perform-
ing data analytics, without compromising privacy of the
users involved, in the following specific setting. Let G2 de-
note a graph whose vertices are the identities of the users
(e.g. names, email id, etc.) and its edges encode relation-
ships (e.g. friendship, citations, professional relation etc.)
among those users. Furthermore, assume that the vertices of
G2 are associated with some sensitive information (e.g. sex-
ual orientation, personal preferences, hometown, relation-
ship status, location history, etc.). A third party is inter-
ested in studying the relationship between the sensitive tags
and the structural properties of G2. To preserve the privacy
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of the users, a sanitized version of G2 would be released.
Assume another graph G1, correlated with G2 and defined
on the same vertex set, is available to the third party as
auxiliary information. In G1, vertices are labeled with user
identities, but no sensitive vertex tags are present. Given the
availability of the public graph G1, we ask the question: Can
we safely release a sanitized graph without compromising the
privacy of the people involved? The challenge lies in the re-
quirement that the sanitized version of G2 should allow for
reliably performing analytics, but not allow the third party
(referred to as the attacker) to learn the identity of the users
(i.e., vertex labels) despite the availability of G1. In the rest
of the paper, we limit our attention to a specific problem,
the so-called community reconstruction. We selected this as
a proxy for a much broader class of grass-analysis questions
because it has structural features in common with many
other problems and recent research work has established a
detailed understanding of its properties.
Our main contributions are as follows. We derive informa-
tion theoretic converses for the anonymous exact community
recovery problem for a large class of random graphs. That is,
we provide a threshold in terms of the problem parameters,
which if met, guarantees that no algorithm can deanonymize
the graph. More specifically:
• We derive a nearly sharp threshold for exact deanony-
mization problem for the class of SBM graphs.
• We characterize partial deanonymity of the system (i.e.
the growth rate of number of vertices that cannot be
deanonymized) as a function of the correlation between
the auxiliary graph G1 and the sensitive graph G2 and
the sparsity of these two graphs.
• We establish that there is a nonempty parameter space
such that G2 cannot be fully deanonymized but exact
community recovery is feasible.
• We investigate methods of modifying G2 to strengthen
its anonymity while preserving community structure.
• We study the behavior of the threshold identified by
our converse as a function of growth rate of communi-
ties with regards to the size of the vertices, n.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to offer
a converse: a statement that under certain conditions, any
deanonymization algorithm must fail. The previous work on
the subject only provides achievability results for the prob-
lem, which describe sufficient conditions on the model pa-
rameters under which deanonymization is possible. This is
done by proving success of specific algorithms in deanonymiz-
ing the graph for a range of problem parameters or by pro-
viding simulation results on specific datasets [23, 25, 26, 14,
13]. Instead, we seek converses that guarantee no algorithm
is able to deanonymize the sanitized graph. As first steps
to solving the problem, we study the converse such that no
algorithm is able to deanonymize the network perfectly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we describe the Stochastic Block Model used in this pa-
per and discuss the community reconstruction problem. We
discuss some of the relevant literature in Section 3. The
system model describing the generation of correlated graphs
and deanonymization attack is discussed in Section 4. Nec-
essary conditions for the anonymity in the Stochastic Block
Model are derived in Section 5. In Section 6, we describe
the existence of anonymized community recovery region and
discuss approaches to boost the anonymity in networks. We
consider the case of growing number of communities in Sec-
tion 7. We evaluate and relate the performance of a partic-
ular deanonymization algorithm to our results in Section 8.
We conclude the paper with some remarks in Section 9.
2. THE STOCHASTIC BLOCKMODEL
Communities are an integral part of any social network.
The community structure also plays an important role in
many data analytics’ applications. In Section 3.2, we shed
light on some applications of community reconstruction to
emphasize its importance. In recent years, community de-
tection/reconstruction problems have been extensively stud-
ied for the Stochastic Block Model (SBM) [5, 7, 20, 11, 1].
SBM is a simple generalization of the Erdo¨s Re´nyi model
that incorporates community structure.
The SBM is defined as follows. Suppose that n vertices are
partitioned into C disjoint subsets, called communities. A
symmetric C×C matrix, P , specifies edge probabilities: for
two vertices u and v in communities i = C(i) and j = C(j),
u and v are adjacent with probability Pij . The presence of
distinct edges is independent. A special case of SBM is the
planted partition model in which the entries of the probabil-
ity matrix P are a constant p on the diagonal and a constant
q off the diagonal. Specifically, Pij = p if the nodes i and
j are in the same community, else Pij = q. It is assumed
that p > q as nodes in a community are relatively densely
connected. Such a network is denoted by SBM(n, p, q).
There has been a series of results for the exact community
recovery in the planted partition model. These studies as-
sume a sparse regime where p = a logn
n
and q = b logn
n
, where
a, b > 0 are some fixed constants.1 The case of two commu-
nities, C = 2, was studied in [1] in which Abbe et al. analyze
the information-theoretic bounds for exact recovery and es-
tablish a phase transition phenomenon for the problem. Ad-
ditionally, they propose a Semidefinite Programming (SDP)
based algorithm for exact recovery of communities. Hajek
et al. subsequently prove that the SDP algorithm is opti-
mal, that is, it recovers the exact communities whenever it
is theoretically possible to do so [10]. Hajek et al. further
extended Abbe et al.’s results to an arbitrary fixed C. As
this particular result is relevant to our derivations, we state
it in Section 6 (See Theorem 3).
Remarks. The definition of a community varies with ap-
plications and algorithms [9, 4]. Also the varying defini-
tions result in the theoretical analysis becoming intractable.
Although the SBM may not capture the community struc-
ture in the real world networks perfectly, it lands itself to
tractable analysis. Apart from simplicity, it also captures
one of the most important elements of communities, assor-
tativity. Hence, we focus on the SBM which has a clear
definition of a community and the ground truth is available
while evaluating an algorithm. Moreover, our results can
be generalized to unequal sized communities which is more
practical, but this scenario makes the analysis more involved
without providing any new insights into the problem.
3. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss some of the important deanony-
mization attacks followed by some applications of commu-
1Learning the community structure is harder for the sparse
regime. Thus, it constitutes the more interesting case.
nity detection in networks. Due to space limitation we only
discuss the most relevant literature.
3.1 Network De-anonymization
In [26], Pedarsani and Grossglauser studied the deanony-
mization problem for two correlated Erdo¨s Re´nyi random
graphs. They assume that both the anonymized and auxil-
iary graphs are sampled from a common underlying Erdo¨s
Re´nyi random graph which results in structural correlation
between the two graphs. They derive sufficient conditions
on the model parameters under which the two graphs can be
matched exactly. Specifically, they prove that the average
degree only needs to grow slightly faster than the logarithm
of order of the network to achieve perfect deanonymization.
A similar problem was considered by Ji et al. in [14]. To
generate the correlated graphs, the sampling process as in
[26] was used, but the underlying graph is drawn from the
configuration model [24]. They derive sufficient conditions
on the model parameters for the perfect as well as partial
deanonymization of networks.
Ji et al. studied the role seed nodes play in assisting the
exact and partial deanonymization process [13]. They de-
rived achievability thresholds for for Erdo¨s Re´nyi random
graphs as well as graphs from arbitrary distribution mod-
els. They also evaluated their results on 24 real world social
networks and showed varying degree of vulnerability among
the networks to the deanonymization attacks.
Yartseva et al. studied the performance of a specific algo-
rithm, the so called percolation graph matching algorithm,
for deanonymizing Erdo¨s Re´nyi random graphs [28]. Start-
ing with some seed nodes, the algorithm incrementally maps
remaining pair of nodes using a thresholding criterion. They
prove sufficient conditions on model parameters which en-
able this algorithm to match the networks almost perfectly.
A phase transition in the initial seed set size is established.
Narayanan and Shmatikov proposed a two-stage algorithm
to deanonymize a network again when the adversary has ac-
cess to an auxiliary network whose user base overlaps par-
tially with that of the anonymized network [23]. After the
seed identification in the first phase, the algorithm prop-
agates this information and identifies further nodes in the
second phase. They show that the users who have accounts
on both Twitter (anonymized) and Flickr (auxiliary) can
be deanonymized with only a 12% error rate. Nilizadeh et
al. enhance the performance of the algorithm in [23] using
the community structure of the network [25]. Their attack
proceeds as follows. First, communities are detected and
mapped in both the anonymized and auxiliary graphs. Sub-
sequently, more seeds are identified within the communities
and deanonymization is performed for each pair of communi-
ties using already existing algorithm of [23]. This algorithm
is again run on the whole graph in case some nodes are not
mapped in the previous steps. The authors show empirically
that this algorithm helps in boosting the deanonymization
process on a specific graph derived from Twitter. The results
in [23, 25] are great examples of why deanonymization poses
a real threat to users, but they do not provide fundamen-
tal limits or even insights into when the deanonymization
problem is hard or easy.
3.2 Community Detection Applications
3.2.1 Privacy Control [15]
Information sharing in an OSN, like photos, statuses, emo-
tions and location, is a common practice for individuals us-
ing the network. An individual’s social contacts may fall into
various categories like family, friends, colleagues and even
finer subgroups. However, users may want to share their in-
formation among a particular group of contacts only. Hence,
it becomes important that users are able to selectively share
their information over such networks.
Recently, community reconstruction has been suggested
as a tool to solve this problem. Community is a group of
tightly connected users where the tightness may be mea-
sured by various metrics for different types of groups. For
example, a close friendship community is characterized by
frequent message sharing. These metrics may be exploited
to automatically detect and label communities which enable
users to selectively share their information.
3.2.2 Sampling in OSNs [29]
The popularity of OSNs has grown beyond imagination in
the last few years and the size of these networks has grown
into millions of users. The data generated by these net-
works is tremendous and very useful for research and other
purposes. As the networks become large, it becomes difficult
to analyze the properties of an entire network.
The sampled graphs should be representative of the orig-
inal graph is terms of both the local and global properties
like degree distributions, node-edge ratio etc. Community
reconstruction plays a crucial role to create such representa-
tive samples of the original graph. In a typical application,
the hierarchical community structure of anetwork is recon-
structed. Sampling is done based on the observed commu-
nities, ensuring that local properties are preserved in the
sampled version. Then, in a bottom-up fashion, these sam-
pled subgraphs are linked together to form a bigger graph.
3.2.3 Viral Meme Prediction [27]
A meme is “an idea, or style that spreads from person to
person within a culture ”. They are similar to infectious dis-
eases within a network. Out of many memes generated each
day only a few of them go viral within a network. This viral
behavior is of value to advertising and marketing businesses.
There are many factors which contribute to the popular-
ity of memes such as timing, point of beginning and others.
Recently, the underlying network structure, specifically com-
munity structure, has also been identified as an important
feature. Community structure exhibits two important phe-
nomena: social reinforcement and homophily. These fea-
tures expose community members to a meme more often.
This results in higher rates of adoption for a meme. Hence a
meme may become more popular within a community with
strong social reinforcement and homophily. The features
like number of initially infected communities, distribution
of infected users across communities, and intra community
interaction strength are used to predict the viral memes.
4. SYSTEMMODEL
In this section, we discuss the system model, followed by
the description of the deanonymization attack and deriva-
tion of the Maximum a Posteriori estimator. First, we dis-
cuss a few preliminaries.
4.1 Preliminaries
For a graph G, let V (G) and E(G) be the node and edge
sets respectively. Let [n] denote the set {1, · · · , n}. All of
the n-vertex graphs that we consider will have vertex set [n].
These numerical vertex labels should not be confused with
the vertex labels (or alternatively tags) coming from the
problem domain. Examples of these tags include names and
private information. To anonymize the graph G2, we need to
remove the relationship between the numerical vertex labels
and the user identities. To do this, we will apply a uniform
random permutation to the numerical vertex labels. We
will always think of a permutation as a function defined
from [n]→ [n]. We denote the collection of all two element
subsets of [n] by
(
[n]
2
)
. The edge set of a graph G is E(G) ⊆(
[n]
2
)
. The community label of a node i ∈ V (G) is denoted
by C(i) ∈ [C], where C is the number of communities.
4.2 Generative Model for Correlated Graphs
Recall the description of the problem in Section 1. There
are two n-vertex graphs, G1 and G2. An attacker has access
to a pair of correlated graphs G1 and pi(G2), both graphs
defined on the same vertex set, denoting the identities of the
users. Here pi is a uniformly random permuation of [n]. The
vertices of the auxiliary graph G1, available to the attacker,
are tagged with user identities but not any sensitive infor-
mation. The vertices of the sensitive graph G2, not available
to the attacker, are tagged with sensitive information. The
anonymized graph pi(G2) is available to the attacker, but
the numerical vertex labels contain no information about
user identities because pi is a uniformly random permuta-
tion. Vertex i in G1 and vertex i in G2 correspond to the
same user, so given G1, the numerical vertex labels in G2
reveal the user identities.
To generate two correlated graphs, G1 and G2, the follow-
ing mechanism is used. This is essentially the same model
which was previously used in [26, 14, 13]. The two cor-
related graphs are assumed to be sampled from a random
underlying graph G on the same set of vertices. Specifi-
cally, G is distributed as SBM(n, p, q) with C equally sized
communities. Each edge {i, j} ∈ E(G) is included in G1
independently with probability s1. The graph G2 is created
similarly using sampling probability s2 and these choices are
independent of all choices made to create G1. As a result,
G1 is SBM(n, ps1, qs1), G2 is SBM(n, ps2, qs2), and E(G1)
and E(G2) are correlated but in general not equal.
4.3 Attack Model
Recall that, G1 is the auxiliary graph and G2 the sensitive
graph. An adversary aims to deanonymize pi(G2) using G1.
A deanonymization attack can be described as a mapping
from the nodes of G1 to the nodes of pi(G2), i.e. a map
pˆi : [n] → [n]. A successful deanonymization attack is the
true mapping pˆi = pi. In that case, we say that the network
G2 is deanonymized exactly.
When true community labels exist in the graphs, we as-
sume that the adversary knows the true labels of all vertices
in both graphs. 2 We say that a permutation preserves
the community structure if it maps vertices only to other
2As we are interested in converses, considering a stronger
adversary does not pose a problem. In fact, given the
anonymized graph pi(G2), the adversary must be able to
perform community detection with high probability (per-
form the intended data analytics) .
vertices with the same community label. That is, a permu-
tation pi is community preserving if ∀ i ∈ [n], C(pi(i)) = C(i).
Because the adversary can recover the community labels in
both graphs, or equivalently can compute both C(i) and
C(pi(i)), they can learn some information about the permu-
tation pi. The adversary can group the vertices of pi(G2)
by community, producing another graph pi′(G2) such that
pi′ preserves communities. In other words, anonymizing G2
using a uniformly random pi does not create additional un-
certainty for the adversary beyond what would be created by
a permutation that preserves the community structure. So
our analysis considers only the latter type of permutation.
An adversary is presented with a statistical estimation
problem. By definition, the Maximum a Posteriori (MAP)
estimator minimizes the adversary’s probability of error. So,
if the MAP estimator does not recover the true permutation
with high probability, then no other estimator can succeed.
We also assume that all the permutations used to anonymize
G2 are equiprobable. Hence, the MAP estimator is same as
the Maximum Likelihood estimator.
If we fix any randomized estimation procedure, then the
adversaries estimate pˆi become a random variable. It will be
more convenient to let Φ = pˆi ◦ pi−1 and work with the ran-
dom permutation Φ rather than pˆi directly. In a successful
attack, Φ = I, the identity permutation. The reason that
Φ is more convenient is that Φ is independent of pi. For
fixed G1 and G2, any change in pi results in a corresponding
change in pˆi and this does not change Φ.
The MAP estimator for this problem can be derived as
follows. We need to compute the likelihood of the poste-
rior probability of a mapping Φ, given the observed graphs
G1 and pi(G2), that is, P [Φ = φ|G1, pi(G2)]. Note that
a particular mapping φ : [n] → [n] induces a mapping
σφ :
(
[n]
2
)→ ([n]
2
)
on the node pairs. Define
Sφ = (E(G1) ∪ σφ(E(G2))) \ (E(G1) ∩ σφ(E(G2))), (1)
which is the symmetric edge difference of the two edge sets.
Also for any graph with community labels, define the fol-
lowing two sets,
Einφ ={(i, j) ∈ Sφ : C(i) = C(j)} (2)
Eoutφ ={(i, j) ∈ Sφ : C(i) 6= C(j)}, (3)
the symmetric edge difference sets corresponding to the intra
and inter community edges respectively.
For SBM graphs defined in Section 2, an easy computation
shows that the posterior probability P [Φ = φ|G1, pi(G2)] is
proportional to c
|Einφ |
1 c
|Eoutφ |
2 , where
c1 =
p(1− s1)(1− s2)
1− p+ p(1− s1)(1− s2)
c2 =
q(1− s1)(1− s2)
1− q + q(1− s1)(1− s2)
Note that c1, c2 ≤ 1. Then the MAP estimator is given by
arg min
φ
log
(
1
c1
)
|Einφ |+ log
(
1
c2
)
|Eoutφ |,
the mapping which minimizes a linear combination of |Ein|
and |Eout| weighted by fixed positive coefficients.
Results in the next section find conditions under which
the MAP estimator fails with high probability.
5. CONDITIONS FOR ANONYMITY
We analyze the anonymity of the graph pi(G2) with the
SBM community structure for the attack model described in
Section 4.3. Recall that the attacker has access to a corre-
lated graph G1 with known vertex labels. In this section we
consider the problem for arbitrary fixed number of commu-
nities C. We generalize the result in Section 7 to study the
impact of growing number of communities. The following
two lemmas are useful in proving the main result. To avoid
making the proof too technical and for ease of presentation,
we present this result for the case in which the community
sizes are equal.
Lemma 1. Let p = a logn
n
and let q = b logn
n
. Let G ∼
SBM(n, p, q) with C equally sized communities. Let Xk be
the number of isolated vertices in community k of G. If
a+(C−1)b
C
< α, then E[Xk] ≥ n1−αC (1 − o(1)). Additionally,
P
[
Xk ≤ n1−α2C
]
→ 0.
Proof. Let n′ = n/C. Define a random variable li as an
indicator of the event that node i is isolated. Then
E[li] = (1− p)n
′−1(1− q)(C−1)n′
Let Sk = {i : C(i) = k}, the vertices of community k. Then
Xk =
∑
i∈Sk li denotes the total number of isolated nodes
in a particular community. The expected value of Xk goes
to infinity:
E[Xk] ≥ n′(1− p)n
′
(1− q)(C−1)n′
= n′
(
1 +
p
1− p
)−n′ (
1 +
q
1− q
)−(C−1)n′
≥ n′
(
exp
(
p
1− p
))−n′ (
exp
(
q
1− q
))−(C−1)n′
=
1
C
exp
(
logn− n
′p
1− p −
(C − 1)n′q
1− q
)
=
1
C
exp
(
logn
(
1− a
C(1− p) −
(C − 1)b
C(1− q)
))
≥ 1
C
exp
(
logn
(
1− α
1− p
))
=
n1−α
C
(1− o(1))
Note that E[X] → ∞ if 1 > a+(C−1)b
C
. We want to show
that V ar(X) is of the same order of E[X]. Then we can use
P[X ≤ 1
2
E[X]] ≤ 4V ar[X]
E[X]2
=
4E[X](1 + o(1))
E[X]2
→ 0 (4)
Now we need to show that the variance is indeed of the order
of expectation.
V ar[X] =
∑
i∈Sk
∑
j∈Sk
E[lilj ]− E[Xk]2
For i, j ∈ Sk, i 6= j, E[lilj ] is equal to
(1− p)2n′−3(1− q)2(C−1)n′ = E[li]
2
1− p =
E[Xk]
2
(n′)2(1− p)
Hence, using E[Xk]→∞ we have
V ar[Xk] = E[Xk] +
n′(n′ − 1)E[Xk]2
(n′)2(1− p) + E[Xk]
2
= E[Xk](1 + o(1))
Hence we have P[X ≤ 1
2
E[X]] → 0. This means that with
probability going to 1, the number of isolated vertices in a
community goes to infinity, growing as n1−α. This completes
the proof.
Recall the MAP decision rule of Section 4.3 which selects
the permutation Φ which maximized the posterior probabil-
ity P [Φ|G1, pi(G2)]. Recall that with our choice of notation,
if the true permutation is identified then Φ = I, the identity
permutation. Next lemma shows that any permutation in
the automorphism group of the intersection graph G1 ∩ G2
achieves at least as large of a posterior probability as the
true permutation I.
Lemma 2. Let G1 and G2 be the correlated SBM graphs.
Let Aut(G1∩G2) denote the automorphism group of G1 ∩ G2.
If φ ∈ Aut(G1∩G2) preserves the community structure, then
P [Φ = φ|G1, pi(G2)] ≥ P [Φ = I|G1, pi(G2)].
Proof. Consider a vertex pair {i, j} ∈ ([n]
2
)
. Suppose
C(i) = C(j). Note that {i, j} can only affect the intra
community edge set symmetric difference defined in (2). If
{i, j} ∈ E(G1 ∩G2) then its contribution to |Einφ | and |EinI |
is equal. This is because both φ and I are in Aut(G1 ∩G2),
so by definition the edges in G1 ∩ G2 remain intact. If
{i, j} /∈ E(G1 ∩ G2), then there are two possibilities. If
{i, j} ∈ E(G1 ∪ G2) then its contribution to |EinI | is 1 and
to |Einφ | is either 0 or 1. If {i, j} /∈ E(G1 ∪ G2) then its
contributions to both is 0. Hence, |EinI | ≥ |Einφ |.
Alternatively, suppose C(i) 6= C(j). Note that {i, j} can
only affect the inter community edge set symmetric differ-
ence defined in (3). The rest of the arguments are similar to
the previous case. Hence, |EoutI | ≥ |Eoutφ |.
Thus P [Φ = φ|G1, pi(G2)] ≥ P [Φ = I|G1, pi(G2)].
Theorem 1 (SBM Converse). If (a+(C−1)b)s1s2
C
< 1−
α then with probability 1− o(1) at least nα/2 vertices of the
graph pi(G2) cannot be deanonymized. Furthermore, these
vertices are all mutually confusable, so there are at least
(1 − o(1))α log2 n bits of uncertainty about the identity of
these vertices.
In particular, if (a+(C−1)b)s1s2
C
< 1 then with probability
1− o(1), pi(G2) cannot be deanonymized exactly using G1.
Proof. Note that G1 ∩G2 ∼ SBM(n, ps1s2, qs2s1) with
the community labels known. Let Xk be the number of iso-
lated vertices in community k of G1 ∩ G2. By Lemma 1,
with probability 1− o(1), Xk = Ω(n1−α). Any permutation
that moves only these isolated vertices, preserving commu-
nity structure, is an automorphism of G1∩G2. By Lemma 2,
the adversary’s posterior probability of such a permutation
is at least as large as the posterior probability of the iden-
tity. Thus the MAP estimator for the whole permutation φ
succeeds with probability at most 1|Aut(G1∩G2)| . As long as
α > 0, Xk → ∞ for all k and |Aut(G1 ∩ G2)| → ∞. For
some isolated vertex i, the MAP estimator for φ(i) succeeds
with probability at most 1|XC(i)| = n
−α/2. With probability
1 − o(1), there are at least (1 − o(1))α log2 n bits of uncer-
tainty about the identity of a particular isolated vertex.
The converse implies that sufficiently sparse pairs of SBM
graphs cannot be exactly deanonymized. Next we provide
a nearly matching achievability region, i.e., a sufficient con-
dition for deanonymizing graph pi(G2) and G1. The impor-
tance of this result is that it illustrates the strength of our
converse in Theorem 1.
Figure 1: Plot showing the safe region (shaded) for s1 = 0.1,
s2 = 0.5 and C = 2. Here CD denotes Community Detection
and DA denotes Deanonymization.
Theorem 2. Let p = a logn
n
and let q = b logn
n
. Let G ∼
SBM(n, p, q) and let G1 and G2 be subsampled from G with
probabilities s1 and s2. If
(a+(C−1)b)s1s2
C
> 2, then there is
an algorithm which exactly recovers pi with probability 1 −
o(1) given pi(G2), G1, and the true community labels for
each of these graphs.
This proof is omitted due to space constraints. Recent work
investigates the analogous problem for Erdo˝s Re´nyi graphs
[6]. Theorem 2 follows from fairly straightforward adapta-
tion of the argument used there. The bound in Theorem 2
has the same dependence on a, b, s1, and s2 as Theorem 1.
In the case of exact deanonimization, the threholds differ
only by a constant factor of 2. Consequently, the condi-
tions that we require our anonymized graph to satisfy are
not excessively conservative.
6. COMMUNITY RECOVERY
Our converse identifies a region on parameters of the model
that guarantees no adversary can deanonymize pi(G2), the
anonymized graph, given access to the auxiliary graph G1.
The anonymized graph pi(G2) is useful to the third parties
only if they are still able to perform community detection in
some portion of the identified region.
In this section, we show that there indeed exists a region in
which community detection succeeds but deanonymization
fails. To do so, we will combine Theorem 1 with a recent
result regarding the feasibility of exact recovery of commu-
nity labels in an SBM graph. This result is tight, but we
only need the achievability part. The following theorem was
proved for the two-community case by Abbe et al. [1] and
independently by Mossel et al. [22], both in 2014. Hajek et
al. generalized the result to arbitrary fixed C [11].
Theorem 3. [11] Let G ∼ SBM(n, p, q) with C commu-
nities, where p = a logn
n
and q = b logn
n
. If
√
a−√b > √C,
then there is an algorithm that exactly recovers the commu-
nity labels of G with probability 1− o(1).
Corollary 1. As long as s1 < 1, there are parameters
s2, a and b such that pi(G2) cannot be deanonymized exactly
using G1 but exact community recovery is possible in G2.
Proof. From Theorem 3 we have the inequality
√
as2 −√
bs2 >
√
C. From Theorem 1 we have (a+ (C−1)b)s1s2 <
C. This region is not empty. For instance, for b→ 0, a must
lie in the range C
s2
< a < C
s1s2
.
Instead of releasing pi(G2) in its original form, we could
release a edge-subsampled version. By subsampling a graph,
Figure 2: Plot depicting the parameter space(below the
curves), for which exact community recovery is possible but
exact deanonymization is impossible for some under sam-
pling probability t, for various values of s1 and C = 2.
we mean randomly including each edge of the graph inde-
pendently with some probability t. In many cases, some
choice of t results in a graph that falls into the safe region.
Then the necessary condition for community detection be-
comes
√
as2t −
√
bs2t >
√
C and the condition preventing
exact deanonymization becomes (a + (C − 1)b)s1s2t < C.
This region is depicted in Figure 1 for two values of t. For
t = 1, we recover the region corresponding to Corollary 1.
It can be seen that subsampling with t = 0.2 results in a
substantial increase in the parameter space of interest. The
subsampling idea works for any number of communities, but
in the two-community case, we have a very simple condition.
Corollary 2. For C = 2, if exact recovery of communi-
ties is possible in G2 and
(
a−b
a+b
)2
+ (1− s1)2 > 1, then there
is some subsampling probability t such that the t-subsampled
version of pi(G2) still allows community detection but cannot
be deanonymized given G1.
The simple structure of this region is depicted in Figure 2.
The ratio a−b
a+b
= p−q
p+q
measures the strength of the com-
munity structure in the SBM graph. Note that because
0 ≤ b ≤ a, we have 0 ≤ a−b
a+b
≤ 1. Unsurprisingly, when
the community structure is stronger, fewer edges of G2 must
be preserved to allow community recovery. This allows us
to create a greater degree of anonymity. The other factor
(1− s1), measures the amount of ground truth information
included in the auxiliary graph. As more of this informa-
tion is publicly available, it becomes harder to produce an
anonymized version of G2.
To produce a graph that can be published, we need to find
a parameter range where there are many isolated vertices in
G1 ∩ G2 and none in G2 (because isolated vertices in G2
prevent exact community recovery). When s1 = 1, we have
E(G2) ⊆ E(G1), so G2 = G1 ∩ G2 and and it becomes
impossible to produce a safe graph, regardless of the strength
of the community structure.
7. SUBLINEAR COMMUNITIES
So far, we have only considered graphs with a constant
number of communities, or equivalently communities with a
number of vertices linear in n. In real world graphs, commu-
nity structure arises for a variety of reasons. For example,
a community derived from common interest in some pop-
ular media franchise could easily have linear size. As the
overall network grows, the probability of a new user being
a member of this community would be close to constant. In
contrast, communities that arise from local real-world inter-
actions will generally be sub-linear in size.
We have assumed that the adversary is capable of de-
tecting the community structure in both the public and
anonymized graphs and correctly matching a community in
one graph to a community in the other. If C is constant,
the community level matching reduces the anonymity of a
single vertex by an asymptotically negligible amount. With-
out the community level matching, log2 n bits are required
to describe the corresponding vertex in other graph. With
it, log2(n/C) = (1 − o(1)) log2 n bits are required. Because
of this, the asymptotic threshold in Theorem 1 does not de-
pend on C, When the number of communities is growing
and the size of a typical community is sub-linear, the com-
munity level matching contains a non-negligible amount of
information about each vertex identity. Consequently, when
C → ∞, the threshold for anonymity does depend on the
growth rate of C. Our converse argument depends on the ex-
istence of community preserving automorphisms of G1∩G2.
If the number of communities is growing with n, it is possible
to have a large number of total isolated vertices in the graph,
but still no communities with multiple isolated vertices. For
this regime, we are not aware of results giving the conditions
under which community recovery is possible, but we derive
the following converse for the deanonymization problem.
Theorem 4. Let the number of communities be C = nβ
for some 0 < β < 1. If (a+(C−1)b)s1s2
C
< 1−α−β then with
probability 1−o(1) at least nα/2 vertices of the graph pi(G2)
cannot be deanonymized. Furthermore, these vertices are all
mutually confusable, so there are at least (1 − o(1))α log2 n
bits of uncertainty about the identity of these vertices.
Proof. Let Xk be the number of isolated vertices in com-
munity k of G1∩G2. By Lemma 1, with probability 1−o(1),
Xk =
n1−α
2nβ
= Ω(n1−α−β). The remainder of the proof is
parallel to that of Theorem 1.
This theorem implies that to achieve the same level of
uncertainty about identities of vertices as in the constant
community case (i. e., (1 − o(1))α log2 n bits), a more con-
servative threshold is needed (Note the shift by β).
8. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we study the utility-privacy trade-off for
both synthetic and real networks. The aim of this section is
two-fold. First, we want to show that when the conditions of
our converse are satisfied, most of the vertices in the network
still remain anonymized. Second, we aim to demonstrate the
existence of real networks which support community recon-
struction without leaking the privacy of most of the users.
8.1 Results for SBM
We consider the percolation based deanonymization algo-
rithm proposed in [28], when an adversary knows the com-
munity partition in the networks. The choice of this al-
gorithm is motivated by the fact that its performance is
guaranteed for random graphs. Other algorithms in the lit-
erature are heuristics based and their performance is highly
dataset dependent. Because the structure of an SBM net-
work is quite uniform, the structural properties used by the
heuristic algorithms are present only in a very few locations.
The percolation algorithm starts with Λ0 number of seed
nodes, and incrementally maps the remaining pair of nodes,
using a thresholding criteria controlled by parameter r ≥ 2.
A large value of r ensures a smaller deanonymization error
but requires large number of seeds to percolate. Conversely,
small values of r make the percolation easier but increase
the error rates. We analyze the performance of this algo-
rithm on the networks drawn from the SBM family with two
communities. We provide the algorithm with Λ0 number of
randomly selected seed nodes. In practice, the algorithm has
to identify the seeds correctly, so our setting is helping the
performance of the algorithms. To make use of the commu-
nity structure, we only allow those mappings which match
nodes belonging to the same community.
The underlying graph is drawn from the SBM distribution
with two communities, that is, G ∼ SBM(n, a logn
n
, b logn
n
).
Graphs G1 and G2 are generated using sampling probabili-
ties s1 and s2 respectively. We also sub-sample the private
graph G2 with probability t. Define the offset for the pa-
rameter space, measuring the distance of parameters from
the threshold for deanonymization, by, δ = (a+b)s1s2t
2
− 1.
Note that, δ < 0 corresponds to the case when exact de-
anonymization is impossible. We are interested in the per-
formance of the algorithm with varying values of the δ.
To generate the datasets, the parameters are fixed as n =
5000, a = 20 and b = 5. We vary the values of the sampling
probabilities s1,s2, and t to tune the parameter δ. The pa-
rameters are tuned such that the community structure is
preserved perfectly, that is, parameters are in the regime
where exact community recovery is possible using SDP. We
first evaluate the algorithm for the thresholding parameter
r = 4, for which the best results were obtained. For each
value of r, the results are compared for four values of the
offset parameter, δ = {−0.4,−0.05, 0.05, 0.75}.
Figure 3(a) shows the percolation behavior of the algo-
rithm for r = 4 and various values of δ. For δ = −0.05, 0.05,
and 0.75, the percolation process exhibits a phase transi-
tion. That is, after some critical value of Λ0, the algorithm
maps almost every node in G1 to some node in G2. But for
δ = −0.4, the algorithm percolates almost linearly in the
number of initial seeds, i.e. it fails to identify many nodes
beyond the randomly given seeds. Hence, in this case, the
algorithm requires a large value of Λ0 to map a significantly
large number of users which is not reasonable or practical.
Figure 3(b) shows the error rates for this scenario. We define
the error rate as the ratio of incorrectly mapped nodes to the
total number of mapped nodes excluding the seeds. The er-
ror rates seem to converge to small values, which means that,
when the algorithm managed to percolate, it deanonymized
the users correctly.
Given that the reason for the failure of the algorithm,
at δ = −0.4, is not the errors in mapping the users, but
rather not being able to percolate, we tested the performance
for r = 2 and r = 3. For r = 2 the percolation process
undergoes a phase transition for all the values of δ. In this
case the error rates were quite high and smaller values of δ
result in even higher error rates as compared to larger values.
In particular, for δ = −0.4, the error rate was more than 0.9
even for a large number of initial seeds, which means that
although the algorithm percolates, it deanonymizes only a
small fraction of users correctly.
Figure 4(a) shows the percolation behavior of the algo-
rithm for r = 3 and various values of δ. Note that, in con-
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Plots for the Percolation method based Deanonymization Algorithm with n = 5000 and r = 4. (a) Total number of
mapped nodes vs Number of seeds, and (b) Error Rate vs Number of Seeds
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Plots for the Percolation method based Deanonymization Algorithm with n = 5000 and r = 3. (a) Total number of
mapped nodes vs Number of seeds, and (b) Error Rate vs Number of Seeds
trast to the case r = 2, the percolation for δ = −0.4 shows
similar behavior to that when r = 4. Hence, even in this
case, at lower negative values of δ, the algorithm requires
a large number of seeds to percolate efficiently. Figure 4(b)
shows the error rates of the algorithm for this case. Although
the error rates are not too high, achieving them still requires
a large number of seeds, especially for negative values of δ.
On the basis of our results, we argue that, although δ < 0
is the threshold for the exact deanonymizability, the perco-
lation algorithm fails significantly if we go somewhat lower
than 0. This is despite the fact that a large number of seed
nodes was handed out to the algorithm as opposed to be-
ing learnt. The algorithm percolates for r = 2 but makes
large number of errors and hence only deanonymizes a small
fraction of users. If δ decreases further, the error rate is ex-
pected to increase even more. For r = 4, although the error
rate is small, achieving this requires a large number of seeds,
if δ is near or below zero, which imposes a limitation on the
applicability of the algorithm in practice.
8.2 Results for Real Network
We consider a real world dataset and study its utility
and privacy trade-off by varying the subsampling param-
eter t. We consider Facebook network [16], containing 4039
users and 88234 edges. The average clustering coefficient
is 0.6055 and fraction of closed triangles is 0.2647 which
suggests strong community structure. We expect the com-
munity structure of the dataset to be resistant to edge per-
turbations. We describe the experimental methodology and
results in the following subsections.
8.2.1 Methodology
Our first aim is to study the effects of edge subsampling on
the community structure. The original dataset is subsam-
pled using the subsampling parameter t = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
and 0.9. As there is no ground truth community labels for
the network, we use the communities detected in the original
network as our ground truth. To detect the communities,
we use the freely available software Pajek [2], utilizing the
Louvain modularity maximization method. We aim to mea-
sure the change in community structure as a function of t.
We define the following parameters.
• Number of Communities: A community is consid-
ered a true community only if it has at least 4 vertices.
• (1− )-Preservation: We find the best match among
the communities of the two networks using the Jac-
card index, J(A,B) = |A∩B||A∪B| . Note that, higher the
index, better the community is preserved. Once the
best match has been found for all the communities,
we define the (1 − )-Preservation as the number of
communities with Jaccard index at least (1 − ). We
consider  ∈ {0.1, 0.15}, which ensures that the com-
munities are preserved extremely well.
Our second aim is to study the effect of sub-sampling on the
anonymity of the dataset. For this purpose, we generate the
auxiliary network by rewiring 30 percent of the edges of the
original network. This choice models an adversary with ac-
cess to an auxiliary network which is highly correlated with
the anonymized one. We then study the deanonymization
results for percolation algorithm [28] for varying values of
sub-sampling parameter t.
8.2.2 Results
Table 1: Number of communities, size of smallest and largest
community and number of well preserved communities for
varying values of sub-sampling parameter t.
t 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
No. of Communities 16 16 17 17 18 17
Minimum Size 19 19 19 19 8 6
Maximum Size 548 548 548 547 547 546
0.9-Preservation 16 15 13 13 11 11
0.85-Preservation 16 16 13 15 13 14
Table 2: Jaccard index of the 5 largest communities for vary-
ing values of sub-sampling parameter t.
t→ 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
1st 1 1 0.9982 0.9982 0.9964
2nd 1 0.9816 0.9834 0.9634 0.9757
3rd 0.9794 0.9861 0.8859 0.8812 0.8977
4th 0.9128 0.9777 0.9596 0.9703 0.9477
5th 1 0.9781 0.9953 0.9802 0.9636
Table 1 shows the results for the Facebook dataset. The
number of communities is well preserved, the maximum cha-
nge being 2 for t = 0.6. The size of the smallest community
is preserved perfectly till t = 0.7 whereas size of the largest
community is always well preserved. This indicates that
small communities tend to break into even smaller ones if
we subsample too much. The most interesting part of the
results is the (1−)-Preservation. Subsampling upto t = 0.7
preserves most of the communities to more than 90% of
the members. Thinking less conservatively, even going upto
t = 0.5 preserves most of the communities to more than 85%
members. These results indicate that most of the commu-
nity structure is well preserved even if we subsample to half
the number of edges. Table 2 shows the Jaccard indices for
the five largest communities in the network. Note that the
minimum size of a community in this scenario was 346, and
corresponds to the smallest community for t = 0.6. As is
evident from the table, most of these communities are pre-
served to over 95%. The results seem to be an outcome of the
already strong community structure in the original network.
The results are motivating in the sense that preservation
of community structure after edge perturbation depends on
the strength of the communities in the original network.
Figure 5 shows the deanonymization results using the per-
colation algorithm with threshold r = 2, 3, 4. We used 500
number of random seeds. This selection was made keeping
in mind that the algorithm should percolate while the num-
ber of seeds is practical as well. Also, as seen in Figure 3,
when near the threshold, the algorithm required around 500
seeds to percolate. As evident in Figure 5(a), the number of
mapped users increases with sub-sampling parameter t for
every value of r. A decreasing pattern is evident in Figure
5(b) for the error rate. The definition of error rate is the
same as in subsection 8.1. Note that for t ≤ 0.7, the error
rate is well above 75% for all values of r. Hence subsampling
this dataset to around t = 0.7 preserves the anonymity of
most of the users while still preserving most of the commu-
nity structure. The best results seem to be obtained with
r = 3 as more users are mapped, compared to r = 4 and
the error rates seem to be similar. Even this choice maps
around 35% users when t = 0.9.
The results obtained indicate that the community struc-
ture is well preserved in the Facebook network at least upto
t = 0.7. Depending on the application, even going as low
as t = 0.5 preserves the community structure to a good ex-
tent. The deanonymization results also indicate that t ≤ 0.7
ensures that most of the users remain anonymized. These
results show that, depending upon the dataset, it is possible
to preserve most of the community structure after edge per-
turbations while preserving the privacy. Most of the studies
until now have missed this point. These results call for more
dataset oriented research into the utility-privacy trade off.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of network de-
anonymizability and established an information theoretic
converse for the exact deanonymizability. This result ap-
plies to any deanonymization algorithm and hence provides
a fundamental limit for this statistical estimation problem.
This is qualitatively different from existing work in this area.
We also improve the state of the art in achievability condi-
tions, where significant effort has already been spent design-
ing both efficient algorithms and information theoretically
optimal methods. In particular, our converse and achiev-
ability bounds have the same parameter dependence. For
exact deanonymization, the bounds match up to a factor of
2. Our work supports the idea that the intersection graph
of the auxiliary and sensitive networks plays a fundamental
role in controlling the feasibility of deanonymization. This
adds to existing evidence from [28], where this intersection
plays a crucial role in the analysis of percolation algorithm.
An important consequence of our result is that it is some-
times possible to prevent deanonymization while preserv-
ing other important structural information contained in the
sensitive graph, particularly the community structure. The
amount of ground truth information available to the public
plays an important role in this trade-off.
The converse only establishes that a subset of the vertices
cannot be deanonymized. However, we make similar strong
requirements in the community reconstruction problem: we
require the community label of every vertex to be learnable.
The existance of a safe region under these very strict def-
initions of deanonymization and community recovery sug-
gests that one might also exist if the definitions are simul-
taneously relaxed. Additionally, simulations illustrate that
deanonymization algorithms tend to fail drastically when
correlation and edge density become too low. The failure
conditions for these algorithms are not identical to the con-
ditions of our converse, but they are closely related. Conse-
quently we believe that it is possible to rigorously establish
stronger impossibility results for deanonymization.
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